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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Disputes over a testamentary instrument, whether between beneficiaries 
or between beneficiaries and executors, can be some of the most vicious, 
expensive, and time-consuming disputes in any area of law.  The emotional 
nature of testamentary disputes, which typically involve family members or 
other close relations, prompted testators and their attorneys to try to devise 
ways to minimize the emotional impact of such disputes.  Arbitration is an 
effective way to minimize the impact of any dispute; however, courts both in 
the United States and abroad have mixed opinions on the enforceability of 
such agreements to arbitrate.1 
The primary dispute regarding enforceability is the issue of weighing the 
rights of the beneficiaries against the intent of the testator.2  One side of the 
argument is that beneficiaries, being non-signatory third parties to the 
testamentary instrument, should not be bound to give up their right to a day 
in court in order to receive their bequest.3  Standard contract principles, such 
as the necessity of consideration to form a binding contract, are the basis for 
this argument.4  Unfortunately, courts have consistently held that 
testamentary instruments are not contracts,5 and therefore the doctrine of 
separability should not apply.6  On the other hand, proponents of enforcing 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Compare In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936), In re Jacobovitz’s Will, 
295 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1968), In re Matter of Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. 
Div. 1981), Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), and In re Calomiris, 
894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006) (these courts reached the decision that an otherwise valid 
arbitration clause in a testamentary instrument was unenforceable), with In re Johnson, 127 
N.W. 133 (Neb. 1910); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013), In re Kalikow, 872 
N.Y.S.2d 511 (App. Div. 2009), and In re Estate of Heiney, No. 1 CA-CV12-0456, 2013 WL 
1846599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (these courts ruled in favor of enforceability, and the court in 
Heiney overturned the ruling in Schoneberger based on legislation enacted specifically stating 
testamentary arbitration clauses are enforceable). 
 2 Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the Parameters for 
Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 118, 121–24 (2011). 
 3 See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. 
L. REV. 1027, 1075–76 (2012) (stating that a beneficiary’s choice to receive their bequest is 
sufficient to satisfy the consideration requirement of standard contract law, and that by 
disclaiming their bequest beneficiaries can demonstrate a lack of consent to arbitration, but 
implying that beneficiaries should not have to make this choice in order to avoid arbitration).  
 4 See generally Horton, supra note 3. 
 5 Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083; Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409. 
 6 See Horton, supra note 3, at 1082–86 (discussing the difficulties of applying the doctrine 
of separability to probate law, and discussing the arguments against applying separability 
doctrine even in contract law). 
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these clauses argue that the intent of the testator, without whom the 
beneficiaries would receive nothing, should govern.7  Those in favor of 
enforcement counter this argument by simply stating that the receipt of 
benefits is sufficient consideration to bind the beneficiaries.8  
This ambiguity in the law led legal theorists and organizations to draft 
model clauses that attempt to maximize the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements in testamentary instruments.  In the United States, the enactment 
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which requires courts to honor valid 
agreements to arbitrate,9 and the establishment of the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), which drafts arbitration rules and model clauses that 
parties may opt to include in contracts, have combined to usher in a period in 
which the enforceability of arbitration agreements in almost all areas of law, 
excluding testamentary disputes, is at its broadest.10 
While the current state of arbitration law in the United States is both 
interesting and dynamic, the more relevant question for this Note is the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements included in testamentary instruments 
outside of the United States.  While the United States has the FAA, there is 
no similarly binding authority on foreign nations.11  In order to promote 
uniformity in the international setting, the International Chamber of 
                                                                                                                   
 7 See S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the 
Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 
275, 294–95 (2012) (discussing how settlor/testator intent in including the arbitration 
agreement in the testamentary instrument is something one would not expect to see 
challenged, but is often what is at issue in disputes over the capacity of the testator and 
validity of the testamentary instrument on the whole); see also Stephen Wills Murphy, 
Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 627, 652–58 (2011) (discussing and critiquing the “Intent Theory” of enforcing 
arbitration in wills and trusts, stating that outside of arbitration agreements the intent of the 
donor almost always controls). 
 8 Horton, supra note 3. 
 9 See Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 10 Janet Lee Herold, Federal Preemption—Arbitration—Federal Arbitration Act Creates 
National Substantive Law Applicable in Federal and State Courts and Supercedes Contrary 
State Statutes, 54 MISS. L.J. 571, 583 (1984) (“[S]tates with arbitration statutes of narrower 
scope than the federal Act must disregard their own law and apply the federal law in state 
court actions.  Uniform application of the Act prevents forum shopping by establishing the 
federal law as controlling in both state and federal courts.  Such uniformity promotes the 
legislative intent of encouraging arbitration since the Act favors arbitration agreements.”). 
 11 The Council for Europe drafted and proposed a “European Convention Providing a 
Uniform Law on Arbitration” in 1966.  This convention was ratified by a grand total of one 
nation.  See European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration, Jan. 20, 1966, 
C.E.T.S. No. 056.  
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Commerce (ICC) created a task force to draft model arbitration rules and 
clauses, similar to those of the AAA, for use in international contracts.12   
The ICC’s 2012 revision of its arbitration rules addressed several of the 
most glaring problems, particularly regarding the arbitration of ubiquitous 
multi-party disputes.13  Unfortunately, another problem has arisen since the 
revision: did the drafters of the model clause intend the clause to function 
solely under the rules it was designed under, or did they intend the clause to 
incorporate revisions to the rules going forward? 
In order to answer this question, two other questions must be answered in 
turn.  First, what were the goals of the 1998 ICC Rules and the 2006 Model 
Clause?  Second, what was the intent of the drafters of the 2006 Model 
Clause?  
After answering the question of whether the 2006 Model Clause should 
now operate under the 2012 Rules, a determination of whether the rules 
revision has affected the overall enforceability of the 2006 Clause can be 
made.   
The subsequent sections begin with the differences between the 1998 and 
2012 Rules, then discuss whether these changes promote or diminish the 
potential enforceability of the Model Clause based on the reasoning of courts 
that heard these disputes in the recent past. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In 1996, the ICC created a task force to revise the ICC’s uniform set of 
rules used to govern arbitration agreements, particularly in the international 
arena.  After two years the task force published the culmination of their 
work.14  The result was the 1998 ICC Model Arbitration Rules.  The drafters 
envisaged these rules to govern a variety of arbitration agreements, but they 
designed the rules with commercial arbitration foremost in mind.15   
                                                                                                                   
 12 See Commission on Arbitration and ADR, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/policy-commissions/arbitration/ (last visited July 3, 2014) 
(highlighting specific goals of the ICC with regard to arbitration). 
 13 Compare RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1998) 
[hereinafter 1998 RULES], with RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 RULES] (specifically compare article 10 of the 1998 Rules with 
articles 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the 2012 Rules). 
 14 1998 RULES, supra note 13. 
 15 Id. art. 1 (“The function of the Court is to provide for the settlement by arbitration of 
business disputes of an international character in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce (the ‘Rules’).  If so empowered by an arbitration 
2015] CHANGING THE GAME  671 
 
 
With the evolution of testamentary arbitration in recent years, the ICC felt 
the need to draft a specific Model Clause for Trust Disputes in order to 
homogenize and incorporate such disputes into the sphere of their arbitration 
system.16  This clause was published in 2006 and was designed to function 
under the 1998 ICC Rules.17  Unfortunately, the 1998 Rules contained 
certain provisions that created hurdles to uniform enforceability.18   
A.  Goals of the 1998 Rules and the Drafters’ Intent 
It is apparent that the primary goal of both the arbitration task force, 
which produced the 1998 Rules, and the ICC in commissioning the task force 
was to investigate the potential for uniform arbitral enforcement and to draft 
a set of rules furthering this goal.19  Outside of testamentary disputes, the 
success of the ICC Arbitration Rules is unquestionable.20  However, at the 
time the 1998 Rules were drafted, the ICC was not yet contemplating 
applying those rules to testamentary disputes because the legal trend at that 
time was to consider such clauses unenforceable.21   
                                                                                                                   
agreement, the Court shall also provide for the settlement by arbitration in accordance with 
these Rules of business disputes not of an international character.”).  
 16 Bruno W. Boesch, The ICC Initiative, 18 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 316, 316 (2012) (“There 
was, at the time, as little surprise at the lack of interest hitherto in the resolution of trust 
disputes by way of arbitration as there was at the desire to remedy this and to expand the ever 
growing province of arbitration.”). 
 17 Id. at 317. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 The International Court of Arbitration, the ICC’s division that actually oversees and 
administrates requests for arbitration made to the ICC, has heard over 20,000 disputes involving 
parties and arbitrators from over 200 countries.  See Statistics, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Int 
roduction-to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics/ (last visited July 3, 2014). 
 21 See In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936), In re Jacobovitz’s Will, 295 
N.Y.S.2d 527 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1968), In re Matter of Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 
1981) (highlighting nearly 100 years of American jurisprudence on the unenforceability of 
arbitration clauses in testamentary instruments); see also Boesch, supra note 16, at 318 
(“Inasmuch as the reservation of trust litigation practitioners went to the arbitrability of trust 
disputes, it was noted, however, that other issues had been deemed not arbitrable in the past, 
yet over time arbitration had gained recognition there too, to wit, labour and, more 
interestingly, competition.  The idea of ‘ousting the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts’ in itself 
did not seem anathema to the working group.”). 
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It is equally obvious that the 1998 Rules were intended to govern all the 
Model Arbitration Clauses that the ICC drafted.22  The drafters’ intent,23 as 
well as that of the ICC as a whole, was to create uniform enforceability, and 
to firmly and definitively provide binding rules that would provide final and 
binding judgments in arbitration agreements across a broad array of legal 
situations.24  
B.  The 2006 Model Clause: Scope and Goals 
The goal of the drafters of the original rules and of the other Model 
Clauses was to provide a framework for arbitration agreements that would be 
universally enforceable.  This was also the aim of the drafters of the 2006 
Model Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes.25  The real question lies in 
whether the drafters intended the 2006 Model Clause to operate solely based 
on the 1998 Rules, or to incorporate future rule revisions into its 
functionality.  Ultimately, it is clear that the drafters did indeed intend the 
Clause to function under revised rules.  Beyond the nonsensical argument 
that the drafters meant the Clause to forever function on an outdated version 
of the rules, the drafters’ own words support the determination that the 
Clause was meant to operate under the modified rules.26 
In a letter to the national committees that appointed the task force 
members, the ICC task force conveyed the points that they had to come to 
                                                                                                                   
 22 See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 6(1) (“Where the parties have agreed to submit to 
arbitration under the Rules, they shall be deemed to have submitted ipso facto to the Rules in 
effect on the date of commencement of the arbitration proceedings, unless they have agreed to 
submit to the Rules in effect on the date of their arbitration agreement.”) (implying that all 
agreements to arbitrate under the ICC Rules, whether via an ICC Model Clause or otherwise, 
will be governed by the Rules.  Each Model Clause specifically states that the agreement is 
subject to the ICC Rules of Arbitration.). 
 23 Id.; Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http:// 
www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/standard-icc-arbitration-cl 
auses/ (last visited July 3, 2014) (indicating that the drafters of the Model Clauses intended them 
to function under the ICC Rules based on the wording of the clauses, as “all disputes arising out 
of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration 
of the International Chamber of Commerce . . .”). 
 24 See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 28(6) (“Every Award shall be binding on the parties. 
By submitting the dispute to arbitration under these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out 
any Award without delay and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of 
recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.”). 
 25 1998 RULES, supra note 13; Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses, supra note 23. 
 26 Boesch, supra note 16, at 317. 
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unanimous agreement on.27  Specifically, the task force told the committees 
they had agreed on “the appropriateness of the ICC rules, with no need to 
adopt specific new arbitration rules” in order to accommodate a Model 
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes.28 
Determining the goals and scope of the 2006 Clause is more complicated.  
It is clear that the ICC and its task force were of the opinion that, if it was 
workable, arbitration of testamentary disputes would become “if not the 
preferred avenue of resolution . . . a sound alternative.”29  The thought was 
that if the ICC could create a working framework—the Rules—and a viable 
way to apply them—the Model Clause—the desirability of arbitrating 
testamentary disputes would cause a shift towards general enforceability 
because those jurisdictions that held on to the antiquated principle of general 
unenforceability would not want to “lose their appeal.”30 
Jurisdictions gain a surprising amount of revenue from having 
testamentary instruments devised within them, mostly arising from estate 
taxes and other fees imposed on both the estates and the beneficiaries as the 
price of doing business, so to speak, within a jurisdiction’s borders.31  The 
amount of monetary value generated from both cash transfers and asset 
transfers that occur as a result of testamentary bequests is staggering.  For 
instance, France saw as much as $196,503,920 in taxable assets bequeathed 
in 2011.32   
                                                                                                                   
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 321. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Revenue Statistics, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (enter “revenue statistics” in the “find in 
themes” search box; follow “Comparative Tables” hyperlink on the left side of the screen; 
select “estate and inheritance taxes” in the “tax” dropdown bar and “tax revenue as % of total 
revenue” in the variable dropdown bar) (last updated Oct. 2, 2013, 4:49 PM) (showing that 
most European nations receive between 0.5% and 0.8% of their tax revenue from estate and 
inheritance taxes, with Belgium receiving 1.3% of their $226,456,400 total tax revenue from 
estate and inheritance taxes in 2011.  That is almost $3 million in revenue solely from estate 
and inheritance taxes.). 
 32 Id. (France receives 0.8% of their total tax revenue from inheritance and estate taxes, a 
total of $9,825,196 in 2011); ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LIMITED, INTERNATIONAL ESTATE AND 
INHERITANCE TAX GUIDE 92 (2013), available at http:// www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAsset 
s/2013-international-estate-and-inheritance-tax-guide/$FILE/2013-international-estate-and-inh 
eritance-tax-guide.pdf  (France’s inheritance tax rates are scaled based on the amount of the 
bequest, ranging from 5% for bequests of less than €8,072 to 45% for bequests of more than 
€1,805,677.  The $196 million high mark for bequests is based on assuming all transfers were 
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While it is unlikely that there is any nation where a significant portion of 
the government’s tax revenue comes solely from estate taxes,33 the amount at 
stake is still enough to make legislators think twice before ignoring the 
progression of estate law towards the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
in testamentary disputes.34 
The scope of the 2006 Model Clause is more difficult to determine.  Up to 
this point, the ICC Rules and the International Court of Arbitration (ICC 
Court) were designed primarily for commercial arbitration,35 and thus 
contained provisions that made their application across different areas of law 
difficult.36  Therefore, when the Model Clause was published in 2006, the 
rules it operated under did not necessarily contemplate their own 
applicability to estate law.37  This was a major obstacle that stood in the way 
of the uniform enforceability that the ICC aimed for, and resulted in several 
jurisdictions declining to enforce the Model Clause for Trust Disputes 
despite enforcing other arbitration clauses that operated under the 1998 ICC 
Rules.38 
It is clear the Model Clause was intended to cover testamentary disputes.  
Otherwise, there would not be a separate and distinct clause for trusts.  
However, the 1998 version of the Rules, under which the Model Clause was 
designed to operate, were not designed with that subject matter in mind.39  
This all changed, however, with the 2012 revision.  The revision has “done 
away with any restriction of the use of the ICC institutional arbitration 
                                                                                                                   
taxed at 5%, though this is astronomically unlikely.  The actual value of assets transferred in 
France in 2011 is assuredly lower, but must still be very high.). 
 33 See Revenue Statistics, supra note 31. 
 34 See Boesch, supra note 16, at 316 (stating that the nation which spearheaded the 
initiative to create the ICC task force to draft the Model Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes 
was France); see also Revenue Statistics, supra note 31 (showing that France has one of the 
highest percentages of its national tax revenue coming from inheritance and estate taxes at 
0.8%).   
 35 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1) (stating explicitly that they were designed “for the 
settlement by arbitration . . . of business disputes not of an international character” (emphasis 
added)). 
 36 Boesch, supra note 16. 
 37 1998 RULES, supra note 13. 
 38 See R. Doak Bishop, Drafting the ICC Arbitral Clause, KING & SPALDING 17, http:// 
www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop5.pdf; see also ICC Germany, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/worldwide-membership/national-committees/icc-germany/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013); OLG Karlsruhe, NJW 688. 
 39 Unlike the 2012 Rules, the 1998 Rules do not contain a clause for trusts or testamentary 
disputes.  See 1998 RULES, supra note 13. 
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system to mere commercial disputes.”40  This leads us to the most important 
question in determining the effect the 2012 revision of the Rules will have on 
the general enforceability of the 2006 Model Clause: what are the differences 
between the 1998 and 2012 rules? 
C.  Substantive Differences from the 2012 Revision 
It is unclear whether the 2012 revision of the Rules will be interpreted as 
providing substantive changes that will affect the enforceability of the Model 
Clause or simply providing inconsequential changes that will have no impact 
on the Model Clause.  At least with regard to their effect on the Model 
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes, it seems clear that the changes are not 
simply inconsequential as major changes were made to provisions of the 
Rules regarding multi-party arbitration,41 the consolidation of multiple 
claims,42 the disclosure obligations of the arbitrator,43 confidentiality 
requirements,44 and the scope and validity of the Rules as a whole.45 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Boesch, supra note 16, at 317 & n.4 (citing 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 2(4)). 
 41 Compare 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7 (articulating the framework for the joinder of 
additional parties to a request for arbitration), with 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 10 (making 
no mention of “multiple parties” outside of discussing the rules for appointing arbitrators 
when multiple parties are involved). 
 42 The 1998 Rules only mention additional claims and the consolidation of claims when 
discussing the rules for appointing arbitrators when there are multiple parties or claims 
between them.  The 2012 Rules contain provisions that deal specifically with the 
consolidation of claims and claims between parties.  Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 
10, with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 8. 
 43 Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7(i)–(2) (requiring arbitrators to disclose any 
conflicts that would bring the “independence” of the arbitrator from the parties and dispute 
into question), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 11(1)–(2) (requiring arbitrators to remain 
“impartial and independent” from the parties and the dispute, and requiring disclosure of 
anything that would call their impartiality or independence into question (emphasis added)). 
 44 The 1998 Rules have no specific provision dealing with the confidentiality of any arbitral 
proceeding or reward, implying that the arbitral tribunal may take sua sponte action to keep 
the proceedings confidential.  See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 20(7).  But see 2012 RULES, 
supra note 13, art. 22(3) (authorizing the arbitral tribunal to “make orders concerning the 
confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings” upon the request of a party, but reserving the 
tribunals right to make such orders of their own accord). 
 45 Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1) (“The function of the [ICC] Court is to 
provide for settlement by arbitration of [international] business disputes . . . .” (emphasis 
added)), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(2) (“[The ICC Court] administers resolution 
of disputes by arbitral tribunals in accordance with the [ICC Rules].  The Court is the only 
body authorized to administer arbitrations under the [ICC] Rules.” (emphasis added)).  
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1.  Multi-Party Disputes 
Where the 1998 Rules gave scant attention to the issue of multi-party 
arbitration, mainly dealing with the approval and appointment of the 
arbitrators but leaving the issue of joinder of additional parties vague,46 the 
2012 revision provides a much more detailed framework for proceeding with 
arbitration involving multiple parties.47   
Specifically, the 2012 Rules allow for the unilateral joinder of additional 
parties to an arbitration proceeding before an arbitrator is appointed, and 
with the consent of all parties involved, after the arbitrator’s appointment.48  
This may be the most important change to the ICC Rules for the purposes of 
enforcing the Model Clause; the ambiguity in the prior Rules about the 
ability to join additional parties is one the greatest obstacles in the way of 
general enforceability.  Considering that the majority of trust disputes 
involve multiple parties, some who may be amenable to the disposition of 
assets and some who may not, the ability to join additional parties is crucial 
to fair and efficient, and therefore desirable, testamentary arbitration. 
2.  Joinder of Claims 
The revised Rules also provide a significantly more defined framework 
for the joinder of additional claims.49  The new rules allow parties, if there 
are more than two, to assert any additional claims they have against the other 
parties.50  This is a major change from the 1998 Rules, which did not 
contemplate the assertion of claims between multiple parties to an arbitration 
proceeding outside of the assertion of counterclaims in the answer.51   
This is a necessary function if the 2012 Rules are to increase the efficacy 
and enforceability of the 2006 Model Clause,52 as trust disputes are often 
complex in terms of both the number of parties involved as well as the 
claims each party has against each other.  For any arbitral award to be 
meaningful, parties must be able to bring all of their grievances to the table.  
If not all aspects of a dispute can be resolved during arbitration, it seems 
                                                                                                                   
 46 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 10. 
 47 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. arts. 5(5), 8. 
 50 Id. art. 8. 
 51 See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, arts. 5(5), 10 (making no mention of additional claims 
outside of the counter-claims asserted in the answer). 
 52 See Boesch, supra note 16, at 316–17. 
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intuitive that those unresolved issues could surface again, potentially leading 
to a challenge of the arbitral award.  The possibility of such challenges 
directly contradicts the goals of efficiency and finality set forth by the ICC.53  
This problem is acute in the context of trust disputes and was compounded 
under the 1998 Rules. 
3.  Disclosure 
Ethical and professional codes and standards of conduct are prevalent in 
most professions, even more so in the legal profession.54  Arbitrators, both 
domestic and international, are bound by ethical and professional codes and 
standards of conduct just as any attorney or judge.55  Under the 2012 Rules, 
arbitrators must now disclose any conflicts of interest, or any other ethical 
dilemma they might have, to all parties involved.56 
While the issue of disclosure by the arbitrator seems like it would only be 
minor given the ethical responsibilities imposed on them by their profession, 
it is in fact quite troublesome in testamentary arbitration.  In commercial 
arbitration, the arbitrator is often a third party either chosen by the parties 
from a list provided by the ICC or appointed by the ICC itself.57  Conversely, 
many arbitrators in testamentary disputes are known to either one or more 
                                                                                                                   
 53 See Commission on Arbitration and ADR, supra note 12. 
 54 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2013), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/mod 
el_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.ht
ml; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT IN THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (2011), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA 
_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#ethics. 
 55 ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54; INTERNATIONAL 
PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 54; AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), 
available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=%2FUCM%2FADRSTG_003867 
&revision=latestreleased; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publicatio 
ns/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#ethics. 
 56 Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7(1)–(2), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 
11(1)–(2).  Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 11(1), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, 
art. 14(1). 
 57 See 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 13(3)–(4) (stating that the ICC Court will appoint 
arbitrators upon the proposal of an ICC national committee if the proposal is deemed 
“appropriate,” or directly when one or more party to the arbitration is “a state or claims to be a 
state entity”); see also 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 9 (stating essentially the same as 
above, but restricting the circumstances under which the ICC Court may directly appoint an 
arbitrator). 
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parties, and can potentially be the executor of the estate when the parties in 
conflict are all beneficiaries.58 
The ICC addressed issues that arise fairly frequently in testamentary 
disputes relating to disclosure in its 2012 revision of the Rules.  Most 
importantly, the 2012 revision addressed the grounds upon which parties 
may challenge an otherwise duly appointed arbitrator.59  In the 1998 version 
of the ICC’s Rules, all that an arbitrator was required to do was “be and 
remain independent of the parties” and “sign a statement of independence 
and disclose in writing . . . any facts or circumstances which might . . . call 
into question [his] independence.”60  The limitation of the requirement to 
“independence” was criticized as not being in line with many other 
arbitration organizations.61  Criticism also came, despite the aforementioned 
professional code of ethics, because the “independence” requirement caused 
discomfort among potential parties to arbitration.62  While an arbitrator may 
indeed be independent from any of the parties, that is not necessarily 
indicative of his impartiality.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “impartial” as 
“[u]nbiased”63 or “[d]isinterested,”64 and defines “independent” as “[n]ot 
subject to the control or influence of another”65 and “[n]ot associated with 
another (often larger) entity.”66  It is plain that there is a fairly significant 
distinction between the terms in how they relate to arbitrators.  An 
“independent” arbitrator need only be outside the control or influence of the 
                                                                                                                   
 58 See 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3) (showing that the 1998 Rules require parties to 
include “all relevant particulars [regarding] the number of arbitrators and their choice . . . and 
any nomination of an arbitrator . . .” where the 2012 Rules allow for “all relevant particulars 
and any observations or proposals . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 59 Id. art. 11(1). 
 60 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7(1)–(2). 
 61 See Richard Power, Briefing Note on ICC Rule Changes, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG 
(Oct. 6, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/10/06/briefing-note-on-icc-rule-ch 
anges/. 
 62 See Ben Giaretta & Ronnie King, Independence, Impartiality and Challenging the 
Appointment of an Arbitrator, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 26, 27 (2005) (discussing the effect bias on the part of the 
arbitrator has on the parties, stating that “it is of vital importance that confidence and trust in the 




 63 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (10th ed. 2014). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 887. 
 66 Id. 
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parties, thus requiring arbitrators only to be independent does not prevent 
them from harboring internal biases toward either party.  Requiring 
arbitrators to affirm that they are both independent, not under the control of 
either party, and impartial, without bias towards either party, is firmly in line 
with the interests of fairness. 
The drafters of the 2012 Rules, however, seem to have made an attempt 
to minimize the challenges to arbitrator nominations by fostering confidence 
in potential parties to arbitration proceedings that the arbitrators will be fair.  
Specifically, the drafters included a provision in the 2012 Rules requiring the 
arbitrator to “sign a statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality, and 
independence” from the parties.67  The 2012 Rules also state that in addition 
to the disclosure of any facts or circumstances that could call the arbitrators 
independence into question, the arbitrators must also disclose “any 
circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to [his] 
impartiality.”68  
Realistically, it seems unlikely that this change will elicit any major 
change in conduct on the part of arbitrators.  As a matter of common sense, 
there is an assumption that the majority of arbitrators do not brazenly ignore 
their own rules of professional conduct, which requires the arbitrator to 
disclose any conflict of interest.69  Nevertheless, the change may serve to 
increase public confidence in arbitrators given the requirement to disclose 
any facts affecting impartiality in addition to independence. 
4.  Confidentiality Requirements 
Closely tied to the issue of disclosure is the issue of confidentiality.  On 
the one hand, parties to arbitration are often concerned with the impartiality 
of the arbitrators, and desire them to disclose any conflicts of interest that 
may bias the result.  On the other hand, parties to arbitration may be even 
                                                                                                                   
 67 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 11(2) (emphasis added). 
 68 Id. 
 69 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 55, at I (laying out the ethical 
obligations of the appointed arbitrators); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, RULES OF ETHICS 
FOR INT’L ARBITRATORS, arts. 3–4 (1987) (discussing the ethical obligations of arbitrators 
when confronted with conflicts of interest), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Defau 
lt.aspx?q=rules%20of%$20ethics%20for%20international%20arbitrators&SearchOption=0& 
MatchCriteria=0&MatchWholeWords=1; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 55, 
at 1–17 (discussing and laying out the framework for what is a conflict of interest, when an 
arbitrator must disclose such circumstances, and the circumstances under which the parties 
may “waive” the conflict of interest). 
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more concerned with what the arbitrator might disclose to others about their 
arbitration, both hearings and awards.  The 2012 Rules attempt to assuage 
this concern by adding a specific provision providing for measures to ensure 
confidentiality.70   
The ICC’s 1998 Rules do not include a specific provision dealing with the 
confidentiality requirements of both arbitrators and parties during and after 
an arbitration proceeding.71  Instead, they only convey a power to the arbitral 
tribunal to take “measures,” sua sponte, regarding the confidentiality of the 
arbitration proceedings in order to “protect[ ] trade secrets and confidential 
information.”72  This change is illustrative of the drafters’ intent to broaden 
the scope of the Rules.  The 1998 provision, with its focus on trade secrets,73 
seemingly contemplates confidentiality solely in commercial arbitration–the 
intended area of application for the Rules from their inception up to the 1998 
version.74  
Given the ICC’s desire to expand the scope of the Rules, as evidenced by 
its endeavors in the area of trust law,75 it is probable the drafters of the 2012 
Rules revised the Rules with this in mind.  The 2012 confidentiality 
provision departs from the “business dispute” focus by allowing, in addition 
to the sua sponte power of the tribunal to ensure the confidentiality of trade 
secrets, for either party to the proceedings to request the tribunal to “make 
orders concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings.”76  This 
allows parties with solely personal or emotional reasons to desire 
confidentiality to request it, and though the tribunal is not required to honor 
the request77 they now have the ability to do so if they choose. 
5.  Overall Scope of the Rules 
As has been discussed previously in this Note, the overall scope of the 
ICC’s Rules for Arbitration have changed significantly as a result of the 
                                                                                                                   
 70 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(3). 
 71 See generally 1998 RULES, supra note 13. 
 72 Id. art. 20(7). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. art. 1(1) (stating that the “function of the [ICC] Court is to provide for the 
settlement by arbitration of business disputes of an international character in accordance with 
the [ICC Rules]”). 
 75 See Boesch, supra note 16, at 317 (discussing ICC’s creation of and orders to the Model 
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes task force). 
 76 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(3). 
 77 Id. (“The tribunal may, [if requested by a party], make orders . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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2012 Rules revisions.  While this change is specifically embodied in Article 
1 of the Rules,78 the changes made to other provisions throughout the Rules 
also evidence the intent of the drafters to modify their scope. 
The addition of provisions dealing with case management and cost 
efficiency may not seem to further the goal of expanding the scope of the 
Rules beyond commercial disputes, however the cost of arbitration can be 
just as high as litigation when not managed properly,79 and thus can 
discourage parties without the means to pursue their claims.   
The arbitration of testamentary disputes does not, for the most part, 
involve parties with unlimited funds who can afford to drag out the 
arbitration proceedings and rack up excessive arbitration costs.  One notable 
exception is arbitration between the executor of the decedent’s estate and one 
or more beneficiaries as executors often have the means to pay for a dragged 
out arbitration proceeding while the beneficiaries cannot.  Thus, beneficiaries 
may be discouraged from pursuing their claims for financial reasons if the 
executor is able to actively delay and unreasonably extend the proceedings.   
The 2012 Rules give arbitration tribunals the power to impose procedural 
requirements on the parties to ensure cost-effective management of the 
proceedings.80  Additionally, the 2012 Rules impose an obligation on both 
the arbitral tribunal as well as the parties to “make every effort to conduct the 
arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.”81  In order to give 
these provisions some bite, and theoretically to provide more protection to 
potential parties without the financial means to engage in lengthy 
proceedings, the drafters of the 2012 Rules included a provision that allows 
the tribunal to modify the costs to be levied on the parties based on their 
conduct.82  Article 37(5) of the 2012 Rules expressly states that the tribunal 
is able, as a result of their power to modify costs based on conduct, to base 
their decisions on factors including the extent to which the parties have 
conducted the arbitration expeditiously and cost effectively.83 
                                                                                                                   
 78 Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1). 
 79 Where attorney fees from litigating trust disputes depend on which attorney or law firm 
the parties have representing them, and thus are relatively incalculable, the AAA and 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution publish fee schedules for their arbitration.  These 
fees are fixed in relation to the amount of the claim, and are relatively low.  See International 
Dispute Resolution Procedures, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (2014), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004338. 
 80 2012 RULES, supra note 13, arts. 22(2), 24(1)–(2). 
 81 Id. art. 22(1). 
 82 See generally id. art. 37(5). 
 83 Id. 
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To reiterate, the drafters of the 2012 Rules made headway into expanding 
the scope of the Rules by modifying the confidentiality provisions of the 
Rules.84  The change may seem minor, but modifying the provision that 
allows the tribunal to impose measures to protect the confidentiality of 
corporate, commercial, and trade secrets85 to include the confidentiality of 
essentially anything, based on a party’s request,86 may actually effectuate a 
large change in the volume of arbitration of non-commercial disputes under 
the ICC Rules.   
Testamentary disputes often involve strictly, and sometimes deeply 
buried, familial issues and disputes, and no one wants their family’s 
proverbial dirty laundry to be aired out to anyone and everyone.  The 1998 
Rules did not have a provision allowing the arbitration tribunal to impose 
confidentiality requirements outside of those involving commercial or trade 
secrets,87 so parties to a testamentary arbitration proceeding were unable to 
request that the tribunal keep the proceedings closed and confidential.  The 
2012 Rules solved this issue by allowing either party to request that 
measures be taken to ensure the confidentiality of nearly anything in the 
proceeding.88 
The 2012 revision has undeniably brought about significant substantive 
changes to the ICC’s Rules, especially when approached from the point of 
view of those who want to use and enforce the Model Arbitration Clause for 
Trust Disputes when drafting their testamentary instrument.  That these 
changes have been made is, however, only part of the picture.  Before the 
question of whether these changes to the Rules will have an effect on the 
general enforceability of the Model Clause can be answered, the state of the 
law must be examined.  The 2012 revision made testamentary arbitration, as 
an alternative to litigation, much more attractive to parties.  But this means 
next to nothing if courts in the U.S. and abroad continue to refuse to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate testamentary disputes. 
                                                                                                                   
 84 See supra Part II.C.4 (explaining how the 2012 Rules were drafted to include a method to 
ensure confidentiality of arbitration proceedings). 
 85 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 20(vii). 
 86 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(iii). 
 87 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 20(vii). 
 88 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(iii). 
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D.  The Current State of the Law 
Despite the existence of the FAA, courts in the U.S. have continued 
holding agreements to arbitrate testamentary disputes to be unenforceable.89  
The prevailing consensus, however, has begun to shift towards enforceability 
in the past few years,90 which, on the whole, seems likely to increase the 
chances a testamentary instrument including the ICC’s Model Arbitration 
Clause for Trust Disputes would be enforced.  Unfortunately, the dominant 
legal regime governing arbitration in the United States is the FAA.91  
Examining the 2012 ICC Rules through the lens of the FAA may have a 
significant effect on the enforceability of the Model Clause in U.S. courts, 
though what that effect may be is yet to be seen.  
The examination of the state of the law abroad is not as simple.  With as 
many legal regimes as there are sovereign nations, it would be impossible to 
discuss the view on the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in 
testamentary instruments of each in this Note.  This section will examine the 
admittedly few opinions of the courts of several nations in Europe and South 
America that have taken divergent views on the issue. 
As a general rule, “the law of the seat of the arbitration determines what 
type of dispute is arbitrable.”92  This question can be multi-faceted, requiring 
a determination of whether the type of dispute is arbitrable under the 
jurisdiction’s laws as well as whether the specific issue in dispute is 
arbitrable.93  In trust disputes, many times the issue in dispute is personal, 
such as mental capacity or competency, or the existence of a marital or filial 
                                                                                                                   
 89 See In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936); In re Jacobovitz’s Will, 295 
N.Y.S.2d 527 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1968); In re Matter of Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 
1981) (discussing the general unenforceability of agreements to arbitrate in testamentary 
instruments based on standard contract law principles, including lack of consideration and 
acceptance). 
 90 See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013); In re Kalikow, 872 N.Y.S.2d 511 
(App. Div. 2009); In re Heiney, No. 1 CA-CV12-0456, 2013 WL 1846599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2013) (discussing the general enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in testamentary 
instruments based on the intent of the donor, and using contract principles such as 
consideration and acceptance to support enforceability). 
 91 Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013). 
 92 Christopher P. Koch, A Tale of Two Cities! – Arbitrating Trust Disputes and the ICC’s 
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes, in 2 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 179, 
187 (Marianne Roth & Michael Geistlinger ed., 2012). 
 93 Id. 
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relationship between the testator and a beneficiary, and the courts of several 
jurisdictions have held such disputes are non-arbitrable.94 
The predominant way national governments are able to make agreements 
to arbitrate testamentary disputes enforceable, whether under the ICC Rules 
or otherwise, is to create a statutory regime that explicitly authorizes their 
validity.  This is analogous to how the FAA handles commercial disputes.  
Germany, which has an ICC National Committee,95 is one such European 
country that has enacted legislation dealing directly with the arbitration of 
trust disputes.96  Germany’s Civil Code requires its courts to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate in trust disputes and qualifies this requirement by 
requiring the arbitral tribunal to be “established[ ] in a manner permissible 
under statute.”97  However, this provision can be interpreted as not requiring 
enforcement at all because, as German case law shows,98 establishment under 
the statute involves a fact-based balancing test to determine whether or not 
the issue in dispute is legally arbitrable.  German courts have weighed “the 
testator’s freedom to dispose of her estate against the protection that probate 
law afforded heirs.”99  Accordingly, German law states that “an arbitration 
clause in testamentary trust is enforceable only to the extent that the trust 
deals with assets that the testator could freely dispose of.”100 
Spain takes a different approach.  Spain’s Arbitration Act provides that 
“[a]rbitration may be validly provided for in a testamentary disposition to 
resolve disputes between beneficiaries or legatees in matters relating to the 
                                                                                                                   
 94 Id.; see In re Fellman, 604 A.2d 263, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that because there 
are statutory protections for the rights of incompetents which provide procedural safeguards not 
present in arbitration, “arbitration is not an appropriate vehicle for determining the incompetency 
of an individual”); Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [OLG Karlsruhe][Higher Regional Court of 
Karlsruhe] July 28, 2009, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 688, 689 (Ger.), available at 
https://www.jurion.de/Urteile/OLG-Karls ruhe/2009-07-28/11-WX-94_07. 
 95 ICC Germany, supra note 38. 
 96 See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO][Code of Civil Procedure], Jan. 30, 1877, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI.] 3202, as amended, § 1066 (Ger.) (“The stipulations of the 
present Book shall apply mutatis mutandis to the arbitral tribunals established, in a manner 
permissible under statute, by last wills or other rulings not based on an agreement.”). 
 97 Id. 
 98 OLG Karlsruhe, supra note 38 (the testator included in the arbitration clause that any 
dispute arising from an attempt to remove the executor would be taken to arbitration.  The 
German court held that because the Civil Code provided an heir with the ability to petition a 
probate court to remove the executor, to reserve that issue for arbitration was outside of the 
testator’s powers.). 
 99 Koch, supra note 92, at 195. 
 100 Id. 
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distribution or administration of the estate.”101  This provision removes the 
vague “established under statute”102 language present in the German Code, 
and strictly limits the scope of arbitrability to the disposition of assets.103  
Several former Spanish colonies, following Spain’s lead, have adopted 
similar systems to deal with testamentary arbitration within their own 
courts.104 
Another European nation, Malta, has taken a much more aggressive 
approach to ensure the enforcement of testamentary arbitration clauses.  
Malta’s Arbitration Act explicitly and strictly provides that “[i]t shall be 
lawful for a settlor of a trust to insert an arbitration clause in a deed of trust 
and such clause shall be binding on all trustees, protectors and any 
beneficiaries under the trust in relation to matters arising under or in relation 
to the trust.”105  This construction of the Act completely removes the 
ambiguity present in both the Spanish Act and the German Code, and 
provides an extraordinarily broad scope to enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate.  Theoretically, even the issues that are deemed unarbitrable in other 
European jurisdictions, like competency and mental capacity, can be subject 
to arbitration under Malta’s Arbitration Act. 
All of the changes from the 1998 to the 2012 Rules listed above will have 
a significant effect on the enforceability of the Model Arbitration Clause for 
Trust Disputes going forward.  However, the formal and textual differences 
between the versions of the Rules are only part of the picture.  In the 
following sections, this Note will discuss how and why these changes affect 
the enforceability of the Model Clause.  
III.  DISCUSSION 
The drafters of the ICC Model Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes 
clearly intended for it to function under the ICC Rules going forward and to 
continue operating under the Rules if they were revised in the future.106  The 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Spanish Arbitration Act, art. X (2011, 11), available at http://www.tab.es/images/docum 
ents/normativa/reforma_ley_60-2003_eng.pdf. 
 102 See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 96. 
 103 See Koch, supra note 92, at 196 (discussing the implications of the wording of the 
Spanish Arbitration Act). 
 104 See id. (discussing how Peru, Honduras, and Bolivia have all followed Spain’s lead). 
 105 Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 387, § 15(2) (Malta), available at http://www.justiceservices. 
gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8854. 
 106 See supra Part II.A (explaining how the original drafters intended for the Rules to be 
interpreted). 
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question now becomes whether the changes made to the ICC Rules in the 
2012 revision will affect the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate 
testamentary disputes going forward.  This Note asserts that the revision will 
cause an increase in the general enforceability of such agreements, as the 
changes made were substantial and relevant to the concerns many courts 
expressed with enforcing such agreements.  Due to the sparse publication of 
opinions from foreign courts regarding this issue, this Note will focus on 
how the 2012 revision addressed the concerns U.S. courts had with enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate in testamentary instruments. 
A.  Enforcement Against Nonsignatory Third Parties 
One of the rationales courts have relied on when holding agreements to 
arbitrate in testamentary instruments unenforceable is based in contract 
law.107  The reasoning behind these holdings is that an agreement to arbitrate 
is essentially a contract, and courts are hesitant to bind non-signatory third 
parties to the terms of contracts unless the third parties are intended 
beneficiaries.  Theorists argue, and some courts have held, that testamentary 
instruments are not contracts, and thus the beneficiaries cannot be bound.108  
The argument is that beneficiaries, who are not signatories to the 
testamentary instrument, have not received consideration sufficient to imply 
an acceptance of the agreement on their part unless they have accepted their 
bequests.109  The logical progression of this argument is that, at least in the 
U.S., a person’s right to have their day in court is so fundamental that it 
                                                                                                                   
 107 See Schoneberger v. Oelez, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning that an 
agreement to arbitrate in a testamentary instrument is not a contract because of lack of 
consideration and consent, an “exchange of promises,” on the part of the beneficiary); id. at 
1081 (discussing the argument that non-signatories cannot be bound unless they receive 
consideration or a “direct benefit” from the testamentary instrument); In re Calomiris, 894 
A.2d 408, 409 (D.C. 2006) (mirrors the sentiment expressed in Schoneberger that an 
arbitration clause in a testamentary instrument does not constitute a “written contract or 
agreement,” and citing the Schoneberger decision as “instructive”). 
 108 Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 410 (quoting Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083 (“Arbitration rests 
on an exchange of promises.  Parties to a contract may decide to exchange promises to 
substitute an arbitral for a judicial forum.  Their agreement to do so may end up binding (or 
benefitting) nonsignatories.  In contrast, a trust does not rest on an exchange of promises.”)). 
 109 See Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1081–82 (discussing that by claiming the benefits of the 
testamentary instrument, or of any contract, non-signatory third parties agree to all of the 
terms of the contract.  The opinion implies that this is a persuasive argument, but goes on to 
rule the beneficiaries of the instrument were not bound to arbitrate because the instrument, an 
inter vivos trust, was not a written contract.).  
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cannot be waived without consideration.  There are, however, myriad 
arguments that oppose this view. 
In his critique of the trend towards enforceability, Stephen Willis Murphy 
puts forward three theories upon which courts have enforced such 
agreements.110  While all three approaches have merit, only one is relevant 
for the purpose of discussing the effects of the revision to the ICC Rules. 
By what Murphy calls “benefit theory,”111 courts have enforced 
agreements to arbitrate in testamentary instruments by relying on the 
rationale that by accepting the benefit conveyed by the instrument, 
beneficiaries have received consideration and accepted the terms of the 
instrument.112  Murphy criticizes this rationale, however, on the basis that 
trustees and executors would not be bound because they have not received 
any benefit or consideration.113  Murphy argues that trustees and executors 
would be free to resort to litigation to resolve any disputes while 
beneficiaries would be bound to rely solely on arbitration.114   
The argument that executors have not received consideration, and 
therefore that this basis for enforcing arbitration agreements is faulty, is a 
moot argument.  The primary concern with courts in enforcing these 
agreements is that they would be binding a non-signatory third party to a 
contract.  Executors and trustees are, by definition, signatories to the 
testamentary instrument.  By consenting to administer the estate of the 
decedent by becoming a signatory to the instrument, executors and trustees 
have agreed to the entire instrument, including the agreement to arbitrate.  
Additionally, many trustees and executors receive a fee for the maintenance 
of the trust or estate, and therefore have received monetary payment as 
consideration for their agreement to be bound by the testamentary 
instrument. 
Probate law in the U.S. usually requires beneficiaries to challenge the 
validity of a testamentary instrument as a whole and does not allow them to 
challenge provisions of the instrument on a piecemeal basis unless they are 
                                                                                                                   
 110 See generally Murphy, supra note 7, at 660–61 (enumerating three theories on which 
enforcement such agreements and then criticizing and refuting each of these theories). 
 111 Id. at 648–49. 
 112 See Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1081–82 (citing Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara 
Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that non-signatories were not 
bound by the arbitration agreement without receiving a direct benefit from the agreement.  
The case was subsequently overruled by legislative action but this particular aspect of the 
holding survived)). 
 113 Murphy, supra note 7, at 649. 
 114 Id.  
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contrary to public policy.115  This presents some beneficiaries with a 
quandary: to accept their bequest, and by doing so accept the validity of the 
instrument as a whole; or to disclaim their bequest, forgoing their legal right 
to it, and challenge the validity of the testamentary instrument as a whole. 
Some legal theorists have suggested that as a way to get around the 
nonsignatory third party issue the doctrine of separability should apply.116  
Under this doctrine, beneficiaries would be able to accept that the 
testamentary instrument on the whole is valid and simply challenge the 
validity of the arbitration clause.  As a logical result, beneficiaries would be 
able to receive their bequest, but still be able to challenge the validity of the 
agreement to arbitrate. The 2012 ICC Rules revision has an answer to this 
argument.  The new rules have streamlined the entire process of challenging 
the validity of both the instrument and the clause.   
The 1998 version of the Rules state that when there is a challenge to the 
“existence, validity, or scope”117 of an arbitration clause, the ICC Court may 
make a prima facie determination as to the existence of an ICC arbitration 
clause.118  This implies the ability to only determine the existence of a clause, 
though it’s scope and validity may be challenged.  Further, the use of ‘may’ 
is indicative that such a determination is not a mandatory response to any 
challenge.  Additionally, the 1998 Rules require the ICC to make the 
determination, which would undoubtedly be a lengthy process given the 
Court’s caseload.   
                                                                                                                   
 115 Williams v. Crickman, 405 N.E.2d 799, 803–04 (Ill. 1980) (“[P]art of an instrument may 
be declared invalid and the remainder allowed to stand where the invalid portions can be 
separated from the instrument as a whole without defeating the intent of the testator.  We 
agree with plaintiff, for example, that if the contested provisions were fraudulently inserted by 
a third party, the court would have the power to deny probate to that provision alone.” 
(citations omitted)); Fineman v. Cent. Nat’l Bank of Cleveland, 175 N.E.2d 837, 842 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1961) (“It may be said that many cases hold that invalid conditions precedent to 
bequests, especially of personal property, need not be performed, and that the donee takes free 
from the condition.  Likewise that, if the main purpose was to make a gift to a legatee, but 
incidentally to require an act contrary to public policy, such as a divorce, then the gift, in so 
far as the unlawful condition is concerned, is unconditional.”).  By virtue of the FAA, 
arbitration is regarded as in favor of and furthering public policy, and thus would not be 
separable from the instrument as a whole. 
 116 See Horton, supra note 3, at 1082–83 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04 (1967) (discussing how the doctrine of separability is implied 
within the FAA itself.  “[T]he Court has interpreted the phrase ‘agreement for arbitration’ in 
section 4 to signify the arbitration clause, rather than the ‘container’ contract in which the 
arbitration clause appears.”)). 
 117 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 6(2). 
 118 Id. 
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The new rules, on the other hand, provide that “[any challenges to] the 
existence, validity, or scope of the arbitration agreement . . . shall be decided 
directly by the arbitral tribunal.”119  The fact that the drafters specifically 
included both “existence” and “validity” is telling.  Parties are able to 
challenge the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, which is analogous to 
challenging the validity of the entire instrument.  Clearly, if there is a clause 
within the instrument but a party is challenging its existence, the party must 
be challenging the validity of the entire will.  The additional, but separate 
and distinct, ability of parties to challenge the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate is analogous to severing the clause from the rest of the instrument.   
In this way, the 2012 Rules address the problem of binding non-
signatories to the agreement to arbitrate regardless of whether they accept 
their bequest.  A beneficiary is able to challenge the validity of the entire will 
by challenging the existence of an included arbitration clause, and still accept 
their bequest without agreeing to the validity of the instrument on the whole.  
Alternatively, beneficiaries who believe the instrument is valid, and by 
accepting their bequests agree to the instrument as a whole, are still able to 
challenge the validity of the arbitration clause.  However, this does not solve 
all the problems.  The ICC Rules provide that the Secretariat of the ICC 
Court is to determine the existence and validity of the clause.120  This means 
that the parties will still have to request a determination from the arbitrating 
body before learning whether or not they can litigate.  However, this is a 
better alternative for beneficiaries than either refusing a bequest and 
litigating the validity of the instrument as a whole or accepting a bequest and 
being bound by all of the terms of the instrument. 
B.  The Issue of Process 
The second major enforcement issue that courts have with agreements to 
arbitrate is that many clauses are either vague or completely silent on many 
crucial procedural issues.121  Erin Katzen argues that one of the main 
justifications for enforcing arbitration agreements is that it is a cheap and fast 
alternative to litigation, the favoring of which reduces the caseload of the 
courts.122  Katzen acknowledges this but concludes that the procedural 
deficiencies of many arbitration clauses undermine this justification for 
                                                                                                                   
 119 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 6(3) (emphasis added). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Katzen, supra note 2. 
 122 Id. at 119. 
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enforcing arbitration agreements because the ambiguity inevitably leads to a 
long and costly determination of what the actual terms of the arbitration 
agreement are.123  On the other hand, it has been argued that as a result of the 
beneficiaries, inability to negotiate any procedural aspects that are specified 
in the clause prior to arbitration, many terms that are specified are 
substantively unconscionable.124 
It is this argument against the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 
testamentary disputes that the 2012 ICC Rules address most directly.  Given 
the text of the ICC Model Clause, it is clear that on its own it does little to 
satisfy any basic requirements for process.  However, when read in 
conjunction with the underlying rules, the majority of the procedural 
deficiencies melt away. 
The major procedural concerns within the scope of this Note are the 
potential ambiguity in the place of arbitration, the ambiguity in the process of 
choosing and appointing arbitrators, and the issue of potential procedural 
gaps in the underlying regulatory scheme.  Additionally, this Note will 
discuss various minor procedural issues that the 2012 Rules revision has also 
ameliorated. 
1.  Place of Arbitration 
One of the concerns with regard to the procedural deficiencies of 
arbitration rules, and by proxy the clauses that operate under them, is the fact 
that the parties may be located in different jurisdictions.  It stands to reason 
that each would want to compel arbitration in their own locale, and in non-
testamentary situations the parties are able to negotiate and decide between 
themselves where arbitration will take place during the drafting of the 
contract.  In a testamentary dispute, however, we have seen that beneficiaries 
are non-signatories and thus have no power to negotiate for arbitration to 
take place in a favorable forum.  The 2012 ICC Rules, however, provide 
beneficiaries and all parties to the proceedings an ad hoc ability to influence 
the place of arbitration.125   
Where the 1998 version of the Rules provide parties requesting arbitration 
the opportunity to submit “comments”126 on the place of arbitration, the 2012 
                                                                                                                   
 123 Id. at 129. 
 124 Id. at 127, 132–35. 
 125 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3). 
 126 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3)(h). 
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Rules add the ability to submit “observations or proposals.”127  Testators 
may or may not decide to include a forum selection clause as an annex to the 
Model Arbitration Clause.  In my view, this addition to the Rules solves two 
issues.   
First, if the agreement to arbitrate does not include a specified forum, the 
Secretariat of the ICC Court is able to review the proposals of the parties and 
determine the most equitable location for the arbitration proceedings.128  
Second, if a location is specified within the testamentary instrument, the 
ability to submit proposals allows parties to challenge the unconscionable 
nature or reasonableness of that provision.  A mirror issue to the concern that 
clauses lack a defined location for arbitration proceedings is that if a location 
is specified, it may be considered substantively unconscionable to require 
one or more of the parties to arbitrate there.  A modified provision in the 
2012 Rules allows parties to challenge the specified location through their 
“observations or proposals.”129  This would allow the Secretariat to 
determine whether or not the specified location is reasonable and whether 
requiring arbitration to proceed in the stated location would be 
unconscionable.  
2.  Appointment of Arbitrators 
Another major procedural concern with enforcing agreements to arbitrate 
is that they often do not include rules for appointing arbitrators.  On the 
unconscionability side of the argument, testators theoretically could provide 
for the appointment of specific arbitrators in the testamentary instrument.  
The 2012 Rules address both of these concerns through two provisions. 
In addition to providing the parties to the proceedings the opportunity to 
submit “observations or proposals” for the place of arbitration, the 2012 
Rules also allow submissions regarding the number of arbitrators and “any 
nomination of an arbitrator” as well.130  The same argument that can be made 
that this revision solves the procedural deficiency of an unspecified forum 
can be made for the problem of selecting arbitrators.  In a situation where no 
arbitrators have been specified in the clause or instrument, the parties can 
submit their proposals to the Secretariat and expect an equitable result. 
                                                                                                                   
 127 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3)(h) (emphasis added). 
 128 Id. arts. 4(3)(h), 18(i). 
 129 Id. arts. 4(3)(h), 18(1). 
 130 Id. art. 4(3)(g)–(h). 
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Unlike the issue of forum selection, where the selection of any given 
forum may impose a hardship on one or more parties, the selection of 
arbitrators does not.  In terms of the potential substantive unconscionability 
of appointing an arbitrator specified in the instrument, the 2012 Rules 
provide two avenues to challenge that appointment.131 
First, parties may submit observations and proposals as to whether or not 
the specified arbitrator should be appointed in their initial request for 
arbitration.132  The Secretariat has the opportunity to appoint arbitrators 
based on those proposals, or to allow the specified arbitrator to go forward 
with the proceedings. 
If the Secretariat declines to remove the specified arbitrator, the aggrieved 
party may still challenge that appointment.133  Parties can challenge the 
appointment of an arbitrator by challenging their “impartiality or 
independence, or otherwise” via written submission to the Secretariat.134  
The Secretariat then has a second chance to review the appointment, 
essentially giving parties the ability to appeal a determination that an 
appointed arbitrator is appropriate. 
The availability of a pseudo-appeal process under the 2012 Rules 
addresses concerns about the ambiguity in many arbitration clauses as to who 
the arbitrators will be and how they will be chosen.  They allow for the 
review of all potential appointments for substantive unconscionability.  
Because all arbitration clauses operating under the ICC Rules must follow 
them, this review process cannot be waived.  Thus, it protects both the intent 
of the testator if they choose to specify arbitrators as well as the beneficiaries 
if those choices were ill advised.  It also provides a fallback framework as to 
how the parties should appoint arbitrators if the clause and testamentary 
instrument do not. 
3.  Procedural Gaps in the Rules 
A third major concern courts and legal theorists have with enforcing 
agreements to arbitrate in testamentary disputes is that the underlying 
regulatory scheme may contain procedural gaps, as the nonsignatory 
beneficiaries are unable to negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement 
                                                                                                                   
 131 Id. arts. 4(3)(g), 14(1). 
 132 Id. art. 4(3)(g). 
 133 Id. art. 14(1). 
 134 Id. (emphasis added). 
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prior to being bound by them.135  An example of this is that where the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide an extensive set of rules governing 
discovery,136 the ICC Rules contain only one article divided into six 
provisions on the subject.137  This is a major concern for courts because if 
parties are bound to arbitrate under a regulatory scheme that is vague as to 
the procedural rules that will govern the case, their right to due process may 
be offended. 
The rules governing the applicable rules of law in an arbitration 
proceeding were carried over from the 1998 Rules to the 2012 version 
without revision.  Article 21 of the 2012 Rules provides that the “parties 
shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral 
tribunal,”138 and in the absence of any such agreement “the arbitral tribunal 
shall apply the rules of law which it [deems] appropriate.”139  The wording of 
the provision specifically says “to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the 
merits of the dispute,”140 which arguably can be read as applying this 
provision solely to the substantive rules of law of the case.  This Note 
asserts, however, both the procedural and substantive law of the chosen legal 
regime should apply where the ICC Rules and the agreement itself are silent.   
Legal commentators have opined that the ICC Rules were intended to rely 
on a relevant national legal regime to fill the gaps to begin with.  This makes 
sense when the multi-national character of the Rules and of the ICC itself is 
taken into account.  What better way to encourage the adoption and 
recognition of their international regulatory scheme than to have the relevant 
local legal regime fill any gaps in the Rules?  A party could hardly argue that 
it had been denied due process when the arbitration proceeded under 
substantially the same procedural guidelines that a litigated dispute would 
have.  
                                                                                                                   
 135 See Katzen, supra note 2, at 134–35 (discussing how a “complete set” of mandatory 
procedures included in an arbitration regulatory scheme, such as the ICC or AAA Rules, 
would be overly onerous.  Katzen uses this as a basis for the argument that, as a result, 
arbitration rules often contain a multitude of gaps in regulating the procedural elements of the 
arbitration.). 
 136 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
 137 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 25. 
 138 Id. art. 21(2).  The same provision can be found in the 1998 version of the Rules.  See 
1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 17(i). 
 139 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 21(2). 
 140 Id. (emphasis added). 
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4.  Minor Procedural Issues Resolved 
In addition to addressing the primary concerns many legal theorists and 
judges have regarding the enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
testamentary instruments, the 2012 Rules contain several provisions that 
remedy minor issues relating to the procedural elements of an arbitration 
proceeding.  Specifically, the 2012 Rules establish provisions that govern 
counterclaims,141 the joinder of additional parties,142 the arbitration of claims 
between multiple parties to the arbitration,143 and the consolidation of 
multiple arbitration proceedings between the same parties.144  While the 
resolution of procedural concerns in these areas is unlikely to sway courts 
towards enforceability by themselves, when taken in aggregate with the 
alleviation of the major concerns I believe the cumulative effect of the 2012 
revision will do so. 
While the 1998 version of the rules contained a provision relating to 
bringing counterclaims, it was ambiguous and did not provide an adequate 
framework on how these claims were to be presented.145  The 2012 version 
has revised this provision, and sets forth substantially more defined 
parameters for asserting a counterclaim.  The 2012 Rules require a more 
defined assertion of “the amounts of any quantified [counterclaims] 
and . . . an estimate of the monetary value of any other counterclaims.”146  
The 2012 Rules also provide, in conjunction with the new provisions 
regarding the consolidation of claims,147 the ability to assert counterclaims 
that arise under more than one arbitration agreement.148  This promotes 
efficiency, as parties are now able to arbitrate all of their disputes in one 
proceeding instead of being forced to either litigate or participate in multiple 
arbitration proceedings. 
The joinder provisions included in the 2012 Rules bring the ICC Rules 
more in line, procedurally speaking, with the federal legal regime of the U.S.  
                                                                                                                   
 141 Id. art. 5(5). 
 142 See supra note 48. 
 143 See supra note 50. 
 144 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 10. 
 145 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 5(v) (states only that counterclaims must be asserted in 
the answer to the request for arbitration, include a description of the dispute, and “a statement 
of the relief sought”). 
 146 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3)(d). 
 147 Id. art. 10. 
 148 Id. 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure149 and allow for the joinder of additional 
parties subject to certain criteria being met.  The 2012 Rules provide that, 
upon request of a party and before the appointment of arbitrators, an 
additional party may be joined to the proceedings.150  Alternatively, 
additional parties may be joined at any time upon the consent of all parties 
including the party to be joined.151   
While not a crucial procedural issue, in my view, courts will be more 
likely to enforce arbitration agreements in testamentary disputes, which often 
involve a multitude of parties that potentially receive notice of the 
proceedings at varying times, if the parties are afforded essentially the same 
procedural tools for joinder that are guaranteed by our federal system. 
Furthering the argument that the 2012 revision will bring the ICC Rules 
more in line with the procedural guidelines of the United States, and 
therefore make their model arbitration clauses more enforceable in the view 
of United States courts, is the new provision pertaining to claims between 
multiple parties.  As we have seen, testamentary disputes often involve a 
multitude of parties.  This being the case, and given the familial context of 
such disputes, there may be more than two sides to the dispute.  Where the 
1998 Rules did not contain any provision relating to asserting claims against 
multiple parties outside of the request for arbitration and the answer,152 the 
2012 Rules allow for claims to be asserted “by any party against any other 
party.”153  This is a crucial addition to the Rules when the addition of a 
joinder provision is taken into account.  Under Article 7, it is possible for 
parties to be joined to the arbitration after the tribunal has been appointed, 
which would mean the request and answer had already been filed with the 
Secretariat.154  If parties were unable to assert claims against any other party 
outside of the answer to the request, the implication is that parties joined by 
consent after the appointment of the arbitrators would essentially be immune 
to claims against them by the other parties.  Allowing parties to file claims 
outside of the request and answer against “any other party”155 brings the 
2012 Rules into line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
                                                                                                                   
 149 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 19–20. 
 150 See supra note 47. 
 151 See supra note 47. 
 152 See generally 1998 RULES, supra note 13. 
 153 See supra note 50. 
 154 See supra note 47. 
 155 See supra note 50. 
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provide a litigating party the ability to join “as many claims as it has against 
an opposing party.”156 
Again, while the resolution of each these minor procedural issues with the 
1998 version of the Rules would probably not sway a court from the opinion 
the Rules are procedural deficient on their own, when taken in aggregate I 
believe the effect is persuasive. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While the overall perception of the validity of agreements to arbitrate in 
testamentary instruments has historically been that they are unenforceable, 
the winds of change are blowing.  Under the FAA, arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation has become a matter of public policy, and that policy 
is to enforce arbitration agreements in order to increase judicial efficiency 
and limit the costs of resolving disputes.  But the application of this point of 
view to arbitration agreements in testamentary instruments has run into 
several obstacles.  In order to increase the presumptive enforceability of their 
model arbitration clauses, including their Model Arbitration Clause for Trust 
Disputes, the ICC has made revisions to the set of rules governing its 
arbitration proceedings accordingly.  This Note has taken the position that 
the changes made in 2012 will increase the enforceability of the ICC Model 
Clause for Trust Disputes, particularly in the United States. 
In almost all other probate situations, the testator’s intent is what governs 
the resolution of a dispute.  This is not so in the case of agreements to 
arbitrate any testamentary disputes.  The major concerns that U.S. courts and 
legal theorists have expressed regarding the enforcement of these agreements 
focus around two major issues: the application of contract law principles to 
probate law, and the procedural deficiencies and ambiguities in the 
regulatory schemes under which such arbitration clauses operate.  
With regard to the concern that application of contract law principles to 
arbitration clauses in the probate context will essentially displace probate 
law, the 2012 Rules provide a solution.  A major issue is that in order to bind 
a non-signatory third party to an arbitration agreement, that party must be an 
intended beneficiary of the agreement.  It cannot be contended that the 
beneficiaries of a trust or will are not the intended beneficiaries of said trust 
or will.  In a commercial contract, the beneficiaries would be bound by the 
acceptance of the benefits of the contract, in the probate context this is the 
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bequest.  The problem occurs when a beneficiary wishes to accept the 
bequest but also wishes to challenge the arbitration agreement.   
Probate courts in the United States have long allowed beneficiaries to 
receive their bequest and still challenge a restriction on receiving that 
bequest as being against public policy (e.g., being able to receive your 
bequest on the condition you divorce your wife).  It could be argued that an 
agreement to arbitrate is a restriction placed on the bequest.  Unfortunately 
for beneficiaries wishing to avoid arbitration, the FAA resulted in a public 
policy of encouraging and enforcing agreements to arbitrate, meaning a 
probate court would likely be unwilling to sever the arbitration clause from 
the rest of the instrument.   
In contract law, the doctrine of separability would apply, and, therefore, 
the beneficiary could argue that while the contract as a whole is valid, the 
arbitration provision is not.  However, courts have consistently ruled that 
testamentary instruments are not “contracts” as such between the testator and 
the beneficiaries.  Therefore, the doctrine of separability, a purely contract 
law principle, cannot apply to these disputes and a beneficiary is stuck 
making the decision to accept the bequest and submit to arbitration, or to 
challenge the validity of the instrument as a whole in probate court.  
The 2012 ICC Rules allow parties to challenge the existence of the 
arbitration clause, which implies the instrument as a whole considering the 
clause is going to be located within the instrument, or to challenge the 
validity of said clause.  Challenging the validity of the clause is analogous to 
severing the clause from the entire instrument, admitting its existence, but 
charging that the specific provision of the instrument containing it is invalid.  
This would allow courts to refrain from applying a contract principle to 
probate law directly, and instead follow the FAA in honoring the agreement 
to arbitrate under the prescribed set of rules, in this case the ICC Rules.  This 
also will solve the dilemma that many beneficiaries may face: to accept a 
potentially much needed bequest or to challenge what may be in their minds 
a fraudulent or invalid testamentary instrument. 
With regard to the concern that there may be procedural deficiencies that 
would essentially rob a beneficiary of due process if they were compelled to 
arbitrate, the 2012 ICC Rules provide a much more concrete resolution.  One 
of the main procedural concerns relating to enforcing arbitration agreements, 
whether commercial or testamentary, is that often the rules under which the 
agreement will operate are either ambiguous, absent, or substantively 
unconscionable.  In the commercial context, these issues are resolved in the 
negotiation stage because both parties have, presumably, relatively equal 
698 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:667 
 
 
bargaining power and they will be able to include procedural guidelines as 
they see necessary.  This is unfortunately not the case in testamentary 
disputes.  There is no bargaining power on the part of the beneficiary, they 
simply are named in an instrument and are unable to negotiate for any 
procedural safeguards at all. 
The 2012 Rules include various provisions governing procedural aspects 
of the arbitration, some of which directly address concerns theorists and 
judges have put forward as reasons to invalidate agreements to arbitrate 
testamentary disputes.  Namely, deficiencies in rules governing where an 
arbitration will take place, who will be appointed as arbitrators, and, in the 
U.S., that there may be underlying gaps in the rules on important procedural 
mechanisms such as discovery.   
While the 2012 Rules do not specifically address these issues in the sense 
that they do not lay out exactly where arbitration will take place and who 
will be appointed, they do create an appellate-like process for those 
decisions.  Under the 2012 Rules, parties can submit observations or 
proposals on nearly every procedural aspect of an arbitration proceeding to 
the Secretariat of the ICC Court in either the request for arbitration or the 
answer to the request.  Therefore, if an arbitration agreement does not 
specify a location or a list of potential, or specific, arbitrators, the parties are 
able to submit their proposals to the ICC Court and expect an equitable 
result.  On the other hand, if the arbitration agreement does set out these 
procedural elements with specificity, parties may still submit their 
observations and proposals.  If, based on those proposals, the Secretariat 
finds them to be unconscionable, it will be able to modify the provisions of 
the agreement so as to make them equitable. 
The ICC Rules are also intended to function with a reliance on domestic 
law to cover any gaps.  While this is not an effect of the 2012 revision, it 
does address the concern that the Rules themselves are under-inclusive in 
terms of procedural safeguards.  It cannot be argued that a party has been 
denied due process due to a deficiency in the underlying rules if, when 
compelled to arbitrate, it is protected by the procedural safeguards it would 
have been entitled to if it had gone to litigation. 
While the main concerns may not have been completely resolved by the 
revision, the question posed in this Note is whether or not the 2012 revision 
has increased the enforceability of the Clause.  My answer is yes.  Overall, 
given the current trend in U.S. law and public policy towards the 
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in testamentary instruments, I 
believe the enforcement of the ICC Model Arbitration Clause for Trust 
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Disputes will increase in the aggregate.  The 2012 revision a addressed the 
major concerns courts have expressed with enforcing these clauses, as well 
as some of those posed by legal theorists upon which courts have not opined.  
Given how recent the revisions were, their true effect will most likely not be 
visible for several years.  In terms of enforceability, I believe the only way to 
go is up.  
  
